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I endorse the ALRC's proposal that fair use be introduced into Australian copyright law. In this
submission, I want to address one key point: Australia should take the opportunity to clearly permit
transformative uses of existing material, without requiring consideration of all four fairness factors.
The key test should be the effect on the core licensing market of existing copyright expression. To
accomplish this,  a new transformative  use exception  should  be  introduced into  Australian  law.
Alternatively, it  should be presumptively fair to make a transformative use of existing material,
regardless  of  commercial  purpose,  the  character  of  the  plaintiff's  work,  and  amount  and
substantiality of the portion used, if the transformative work does not  displace the market for the
existing material.
While modelling an Australian fair use provision on existing US legislation is desirable in general
terms, Australia  has  the opportunity to clarify some of the outstanding difficulties of US fair use
law.  In order to encourage creativity and a diverse culture,  transformative uses – uses of existing
material that are not substitutable for the original and do not displace core licensing markets –
should presumptively be excluded from the copyright grant. Recent case law, including The Panel1
and  Kookaburra,2 demonstrates  that  current  Australian  law  does  note  adequately  enable
contemporary creative practices.  The US fair use test goes some way to enabling transformative
uses, but conflicting circuit court reasons in recent cases, like  Bridgeport Music3 and Newton v
Diamond,4 or  Suntrust  v  Houghton  Mifflin5 and Salinger  v  Colting,6 show  that  authors  face
continuing difficulties  in  showing that  their  creative  borrowing is  permissible.  A clear  fair  use
exception should be introduced that will allow (amongst other things) Australian creators to reuse
existing copyright material in the creation of new works. 
Creativity is always informed by previous works; our future culture will always be built upon the
past.7 Because  borrowing  is  fundamental  to  artistic  practice,  any  copyright  law  that  requires
licensing  of  creative  influences  acts  as  a  tax  on  creativity.  Restrictions  on  borrowing  create
disincentives for the creation of new work; enable existing owners to veto new expression;8 cause
artists  to self-censor;9 and introduce non-trivial  transaction costs  that slow the creative process.
Allowing creative borrowing, by contrast, imposes little harm on the revenues of copyright owners.
The market for Kookaburra Sits in an Old Gum Tree was not displaced by Down Under;10 Channel
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Certainly, both Men at Work and Network Ten derived benefit from using existing material. Their
use,  however,  imposed no harm.  The only way these  decisions  can  be justified is  by taking a
restitutionary view of copyright: assuming that benefits derived from use are interferences with the
property right of copyright owners that should be protected.12 It is tautological to claim that harm is
done because copyright  owners have a  right  to  control  transformative uses of their  work.  This
proposition begs the question: what rights should form part of the exclusive rights of copyright
owners? 
The right to control transformative uses of existing material should not form part of the exclusive
rights  of  copyright  owners. In  terms  of  efficiency,  Australia's  goal  to  improve  its  innovation
economy depends on the ability  of Australians  to  access  and improve upon our knowledge  and
cultural  resources.13 In the interests of encouraging innovation, we should prefer a construction of
copyright that enables Australians to derive benefit from  reusing  existing works where their use
imposes little harm to the market of the original. In terms of fairness, we should prefer a copyright
law  that  supports  decentralised  creativity.14 Because  popular,  established  works  are  likely
disproportionately used in  the creation of new work,  a  requirement  that  future authors pay for
creative debts to past authors is a regressive tax that transfers wealth from less established authors
to more established ones.  This is harmful for emerging artists, for amateurs playing with culture,
and for values of diversity in speech. Unless the right to control transformative uses can be shown
to be necessary to incentivise investment (this might be true in certain limited cases, such as music
synch rights) it is actually likely to be counterproductive in terms of encouraging creativity15 and
supporting artists. 
From this normative position, it should be clear that the exclusive right to control derivatives should
be more closely linked to the narrow right of adaptation, rather than the current  effective right to
control all recognisable uses of expression in future works. Because, as Gordon argues, “culture is
interdependence”,16 a copyright law that seeks to encourage creativity should not conflate artistic
debts with monetary ones. From this perspective, subjecting transformative uses to a four-factor fair
use analysis is not useful. The major problem is that in common discourse, the normative concept of
'fairness'  does  not  clearly represent  what  is  efficient  and socially  desirable.  The positioning of
copyright law as centred on protecting romantic authorship has created a discourse that preferences
established  authors  to  the  detriment  of  'mere'  amateurs,  'postmodern'  appropriation  artists,17 or
'free-riders'.  The current debate seems to embody a restitutionary view of fairness that does not
adequately respect the authorship interests of decentralised and emerging creators.  Jessica Litman
aptly summarises the argument:
Songs Australia Pty Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd’ (2013) 23 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 
142, 155; Peter Knight, ‘Fair Use or Fowl? Reconsidering Fair Use Defences in Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI’ 
(2010) 22 Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 172, 173 (arguing that Down Under is not substitutable for 
Kookaburra); Steve Collins, ‘Kookaburra V. Down Under: It’s Just Overkill’ (2010) 7 Scan: Journal of Media Arts 
Culture <http://scan.net.au/SCAN/journal/display.php?journal_id=145> (‘In the context of ’Down Under‘ and 
’Kookaburra ...‘ it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which an individual would purchase the former over the 
latter in pursuit of enjoying the melody from ’Kookaburra ...‘.’).
11 Michael Handler and David Rolph, ‘A Real Pea Souper: The Panel Case and the Development of the Fair Dealing 
Defences to Copyright Infringement in Australia’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 381, 405 (arguing 
that the court did not adequately enquire about ‘whether the defendant’s use competes with or supplants the market 
for the plaintiff’s broadcast.").
12 DJ Brennan, ‘The Beautiful Restitutionary Heresy of a Larrikin’ (2011) 33 Sydney L. Rev. 209.
13 Cutler & Co, ‘Venturous Australia - Building Strength in Innovation’ (Report for the Minister for Innivation, 
Industry, Science and Research, 2008) 
<http://www.innovation.gov.au/Innovation/Policy/Pages/ReviewoftheNationalInnovationSystem.aspx>.
14 Julie E Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 1151.
15 DE Bambauer, ‘Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album’ (2008) 59 Alabama Law Review 345.
16 Wendy J Gordon, ‘On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse’ (1992) 78 
Virginia Law Review 149, 168.
17 AIPP Submission #564, p 5.
“Nurturing authorship is not necessarily the same thing as nurturing authors. When 
individual authors claim that they are entitled to incentives that would impoverish the 
milieu in which other authors must also work, we must guard against protecting authors 
at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.”18
If we accept that copyright should enable and encourage decetranlised authorship, at least where
that does not conflict with the ability of authors and publishers to recoup their investments, then it
becomes clear that the only relevant test in transformative use cases is the effect on the market. An
important qualification here is that  a transformative use exception should not be displaced by
the availability of private licensing agreements.  The appropriate scope of copyright should be
determined by legislation;  it  is  wholly appropriate  for  Australia  to  conclude that  the  copyright
monopoly does not extend to controlling transformative uses on efficiency and fairness grounds. In
this case, the fact that a use can be licensed should not be confused with the normative conclusion
that licensing is not required.19 The implication is that the 'effect upon the market'  test must be
limited to direct substitution, unless the work is in a category of works where there is clear evidence
to support public policy that copyright owners ought to be entitled to control derivative uses.
The other three fair use factors are not relevant in determining whether an unlicensed transformative
use  should  be  permissible.  After  the  threshold  of  transformativeness  has  been  passed,
commerciality should not alter the fair use analysis. Principle 2 requires that copyright maintain
incentives for the creation of new works. In order to create a system where Australians can derive a
benefit  from licensing their  works,  future creators  should not be discouraged from engaging in
commercial  reuse  of  existing  material  that  imposes  no  harm on  the  incentives  of  the  original
creator/publisher of that material.
Similarly, 'the nature of the copyrighted work' should have a limited impact on the ability to
engage in transformative uses. In particular, the fact that the plaintiff's work was a creative work
should not make it more difficult to use that material in the production of a new creative work.
There are very good reasons that creators may wish to reuse existing creative expression – including
for its impact20 and because of a personal connection the author has with the existing work.21 In the
interests  of  promoting  creative  practice,  it  is  counterproductive  to  limit  the  range  of  material
available for reuse by reference to its creative nature.  To do so requires judicial examination of
artistic  decisions (could  another  work  have  been  used?) –  an  enterprise  that  is  notoriously
problematic.
Finally,  the 'amount and substantiality' test is also unhelpful in transformative uses.  Rebecca
Tushnet has powerfully argued that there are very important legitimate reasons why authors may
choose to quote much or all of an existing work;22 asking whether a defendant took more than was
necessary to fulfil her purpose is just as problematic as asking whether another work could have
been used instead. In the US, this factor has led to a strange distinction where The Wind Done Gone
was potentially fair use,23 but 60 Years Later was not.24 Neither was likely to damage the market for
the original;  if copyright law aims to encourage creativity (or at least not unnecessarily harm it),
both should be permissible.
For  these  reasons, it  is probably more desirable that a separate transformative use exception be
introduced, in addition to a general fair use exception.  The Discussion Paper notes that there is
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some difficulty in drawing a line between 'adaptations' (which must be licensed) and 'transformative
uses' (which may be the subject of an exception). This is important, and creating a bright line rule is
not straightforward, but neither would it be impossible. More consultation is required on this point –
it  will  be important  to  identify how the purpose of  copyright  is  best  advanced,  and this  likely
requires identifying the circumstances in which the right to control derivative uses are important to
the incentives of producers. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that the proper scope of the
adaptation right might be much more limited than the current combination of the exclusive rights of
reproduction and adaptation provides. If encouraging authorship and diversity in expression is the
goal  of  copyright,  the  right  to  control  derivatives  should  likely  be  narrowly tailored  to  direct
translations  and  adaptations,  rather  than  retellings,  remixes,  pastiches,  mashups,  prequels  or
continuations.  The protections afforded by trade mark law, passing off, and the right of integrity
may well be sufficient in most cases to protect the legitimate interests of authors and producers.
Use by third parties
It  is  important  to  remember  that  transformative  works  must  be  able  to  be  disseminated,
including by third parties as appropriate.  The ALRC notes several concerns that third parties
should not be entitled to benefit ('free-ride') by enabling or facilitating others to exercise their fair
use rights.  With respect,  these concerns are  misguided.  They  again depend upon a restitutionary
view of copyright, and ignore an important point: once a new non-infringing work has been created,
our copyright system must still provide for it to be distributed. The reason that exceptions exist for
productive uses is that they provide social value; in order for these exceptions to be effective, then,
the material must be able to be distributed, and this implies that the help of third parties must be
able to be enlisted. So, for example, when a researcher quotes an extract of a published work in a
scholarly paper, the purpose of copyright is furthered when that work is distributed. When a new
author creates a new song that borrows from existing works, the purpose of copyright is furthered
when that new work is distributed. In order to avoid a tragedy of the anticommons,25 the creator of
the new work in each case must have the exclusive right to enter into a licence agreement with a
distributor, and the subsequent communication of that work should not trigger liability against the
owners of any works that have been used in its creation.  In these examples, neither a scholarly
publisher nor YouTube should be liable for communicating the underlying copyright works to the
public,  and they should not be required to demonstrate that they are engaging in a fair use of the
original. If the reason we permit transformative uses is to enable new works to be created, it makes
no  sense  to  argue,  as  APRA/AMCOS does,  that  “[a]ll  subsequent  uses  are,  by definition,  not
themselves  transformative”  and  should  therefore  “not  be  the  subject  of  [a  transformative  use]
exception”.26
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